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NOTES
SECURITY INTERESTS IN INSURANCE PAYMENTS ON
DESTROYED COLLATERAL AS "PROCEEDS" AND THEIR
PRIORITY UNDER THE FEDERAL TAX LIEN ACT OF 1966
I.

INTRODUCTION

Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),' covering secured
transactions, replaced what has been called "the hodgepodge of pre-code

chattel security law ' 2 with a uniform framework for regulating security
interests in personal property and fixtures. 3 The ever increasing complexity
and sophistication of modern commercial financing transactions undeniably
required such a uniform statute.
Article 9 abolished many of the largely formal state law distinctions
between various types of pre-Code security interests 4 and substituted the
single term "security interest" for the various labels which had been used to
distinguish security interests created under a variety of devices. 5 In a secured
transaction covered by article 9 there is a "debtor" (typically a borrower), and
a "secured party" (typically a lender).
An innovative feature of the Code is its treatment of the concept of
"proceeds." "Proceeds" are generated when, for example, a debtor sells the
secured collateral to a third party and receives money or other consideration
in return. Under article 9, the secured party's interest will normally extend to
the consideration thus received. 6 The Code defines "proceeds" broadly to
include 'whatever is received when collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged,
collected or otherwise disposed of. . . .
Although article 9 purports to cover all secured transactions involving
personal property and fixtures, certain kinds of transactions are specifically
excluded from its broad scope, chiefly because an adequate body of either
state or federal law already existed. 8 Section 9-104(g), for example, provides
that article 9 does not apply "to a transfer of an interest or claim in or under
any policy of insurance . . ...9 Therefore, a conflict may arise when the
secured party endeavors to claim priority in its security interest (e.g., insur1. Unless otherwise indicated, references are to the 1962 version of the Uniform Commercial
Code [hereinafter cited as UCC].
2. Coogan, Relationship of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code to Pre-Code Chattel
Security Law, 51 Va. L. Rev. 853 (1965).
3. UCC § 9-101, Comment.
4. Id.
5. For example, conditional sales, factor's liens, chattel mortgages and assignments of
accounts receivable. UCC § 9-101, Comment; see Coogan, Relationship of Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code to Pre-Code Chattel Security Law, 51 Va. L. Rev. 853, 856 (1965).
6. See UCC § 9-306.
7. UCC § 9-306(1) (emphasis added).
8. See UCC § 9-104, Comments 1-8.
9. UCC § 9-104(g).
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ance proceeds) over that of a competing creditor asserting that the transaction
does not fall within the UCC's umbrella of protection.
A simple hypothetical' ° will illustrate some of the problems involved.
Assume that Debtor takes a loan from Bank-the secured party. As collateral
for the loan, Debtor executes a security agreement which grants Bank a
security interest in Debtor's tractor. The financing statement, which is
properly filed," also covers "proceeds"' 2 of the collateral. If Debtor subsequently trades in his tractor for a new tractor, Bank's security interest in the
original collateral will in all probability continue in the old tractor,' 3 and
certainly in the new one as "proceeds" of the original collateral.'"
Suppose, however, that the original tractor, which was covered by a valid
insurance policy, had been destroyed in an accident. Would Bank be entitled
to the insurance payments as "proceeds" of the collateral by virtue of its
original security interest in the tractor? This question, reduced to its simplest
terms, asks whether insurance payments made to a debtor as a result of
damage to or destruction of the collateral in a secured transaction can
constitute "proceeds" of the collateral as defined in section 9-306(1)l s of the
Code. If insurance payments can be "proceeds," then, under the assumed
facts, Bank's security interest would extend to the insurance fund created
when the tractor was destroyed.
Although commentators have been virtually unanimous in concluding that
insurance can be UCC "proceeds,' '1 6 courts which have considered the

10. Suggested by the facts in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv Corp., 101
R.I. 287, 222 A.2d 571 (1966).
11. Filing is required to perfect Bank's security interest UCC § 9-302(1l). In most cases, filing
is a prerequisite to perfection. It is not, however, always necessary to perfect a security interest
(see UCC § 9-302), and some interests cannot be perfected by filing; see UCC § 9-304.
12. Under the 1962 version of the Code, checking the "proceeds box" on the filed financing
statement is necessary to continue a secured party's perfected security interest in "proceeds"
beyond ten days after the debtor receives the "proceeds." UCC § 9-306(31(a).
13. UCC § 9-306(2). Unless Bank "authorized" the trade-in. Id.
14. UCC § 9-306(1); see Howarth v. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., 203 F. Supp 279 (MD.
Pa. 1962); Girard Trust Corn Exch. Bank v. Warren Lepley Ford, Inc., 25 Pa. D & C.2d 395
(C.P. 1958).
15. UCC § 9-306(l) provides: " 'Proceeds' includes whatever is received when collateral or
proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of. The term also includes the
account arising when the right to payment is earned under a contract right. Money, checks and
the like are 'cash proceeds.' All other proceeds are 'non-cash proceeds.' " Compare UCC
§ 9-306(1) (1972 version).
16. See 1 P. Coogan, W. Hogan & D. Vagts, Secured Transactions under the Uniform
Commercial Code § 3A.03[c], at 207 (1976); R. Henson, Secured Transacuons § 6-S (1973),
Boroff, Insurance Proceeds under Section 9-306: Before and After. 79 Com. L.J 442, 444-45
(1974); Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 518 (1973); Dawson, The 1972
Amendments to Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial Code: Attachment and Enforceability,
Future Advances, and Proceeds, 54 Ore. L. Rev, 251, 272 (1975); Gillombardo, The Treatment
of Uniform Commercial Code Proceeds in Bankruptcy: A Proposed Redraft of Section 9-306, 38
U. Cin. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1969); Henson, Insurance Proceeds as "Proceeds" under Article 9, 18 Cath.
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question have, until recently,' 7 taken a contrary position.1 8 Courts have
basically found three obstacles to the creation of a UCC security interest in
insurance payments. First, the insurance exclusion contained in section
9-104(g) was held to bar such a security interest. 19 Second, it was found that
the words "sold, exchanged,
collected or otherwise disposed of" in the
"proceeds" definition 2 0 applied only to a voluntary disposition of the collateral
and not to the involuntary disp'osition which gives rise to an insurance fund. 2'
Third, the courts have held that because an insurance policy embodies a
"personal contract" which does not attach to or run with the property insured,
the secured party may not claim the insurance fund as "proceeds" of the
collateral. 22
It is the contention of this Note, however, that the original intention of the
Code's drafters was not to exclude insurance payments from the section
9-306(1) definition of "proceeds. ' 23 This Note will also examine the priority
problem of an intervening federal tax lien, based on assessments against
Debtor for unpaid taxes, when filed subsequent to the24 date Bank's security
interest in the insurance proceeds became perfected.
U.L. Rev. 453 (1969); Henson, Some "Proceeds" and Priority Problems under Revised Article 9,
12 Wm.& Mary L. Rev. 750, 757 (1971).
17. See PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'g 384 F.
Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Firemen's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Ken-Lori Knits, Inc., 399 F. Supp.
286 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); In re Hunter, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 928 (S.D. Ohio 1971). But see
Hamilton Bank v. Bell, 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 334 (E.D. Tenn. 1976) (decided almost three weeks
after PPG Industries, supra, without citing it); Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v. Stikes, 18 UCC
Rep. Serv. 576 (S.D. Ala. 1975) (dictum).
18. In re Levine, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 238 (D. Conn. 1969); National Bedding & Furniture
Indus., Inc. v. Clark, 252 Ark. 780, 790, 481 S.W.2d 690, 695 (1972) (dissenting opinion); White
v. Household Fin. Corp., 302 N.E.2d 828, 836 n.9 (Ind. Ct. App. 1973); Quigley v. Caron, 247
A.2d 94 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 222
A.2d 571 (1966); cf. In re Hix, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 925 (S.D. Ohio 1969); Hoffman v. Snack, 37
Pa. D. & C.2d 145 (C.P. 1964).
19. In re Levine, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 238, 242 (D. Conn. 1969); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v.
Roller, CCH 1969 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep., U.S. Tax Cas. (69-1 at 83,958) 9214 (D. Ariz. 1968);
Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94, 96 (Me. 1968).
20. UCC § 9-306(1).
21. In re Hix, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 925, 927 (S.D. Ohio 1969); In re Levine, 6 UCC Rep. Serv.
238, 241 (D. Conn. 1969); Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94, 96 (Me. 1968); Universal CI.T. Credit
Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 294, 222 A.2d 571, 575 (1966); cf. Hoffman v.
Snack, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 145, 147 (C.P. 1964).
22. In re Levine, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 238, 241 (D. Conn. 1969); National Bedding & Furniture
Indus., Inc. v. Clark, 252 Ark. 780, 790, 481 S.W.2d 690, 695 (1972) (dissenting opinion);
Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94, 95-96 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential
Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 292-93, 222 A.2d 571, 574-75 (1966); Distributor's Warehouse, Inc. v.
Madison Auto Parts & Serv. Corp., 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 569, 573 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. 1970).
23.
PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976), noted in 176
N.Y.L.J., July 22, 1976, at 4, cols. 1-2; see notes 63, 154 infra and accompanying text. See also
note 16 supra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 80-182 infra and accompanying text.
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BARRIERS TO SECURITY INTERESTS IN INSURANCE "PROCEEDS"

A. The Insurance Exclusion
As previously stated, certain types of transactions are excluded from the
coverage of article 9 by section 9-104, primarily because the subject matter
2S
involved was deemed to have been adequately covered by prior statutes.
Thus, section 9-104(g) provides that article 9 does not apply "to a transfer of
an interest or claim in or under any policy of insurance ....
"26 This
subsection was held to bar the creation of a continuing UCC security interest
in the insurance proceeds of damaged or destroyed collateral.2 7 The correct
view, however, would appear to be that taken by commentators28 and the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals in PPG Industries, Inc. v. Hartford Fire
Insurance Co. 29 that section 9-104(g) is not a bar to the creation of a security
interest in the insurance "proceeds" of destroyed collateral. In PPG Industries, the Second Circuit held that the "exclusion applies only to situations
where the parties to a security agreement attempt to create a direct security
interest in an insurance policy by making the policy itself the immediate
collateral securing the transaction. ' 30 The official cor'ment to section 9-104(g)
indicates that the provision was intended to apply basically to life insurance
policies 31 and was perhaps not meant to cover the situation under discussion. 32 As one textwriter has stated the problem:
There have been some cases suggesting that since subsection 9-104(g) excludes
insurance from the general coverage of Article 9, insurance payments for damaged
collateral cannot be proceeds under 9-306. While 9-104(g) might have been more

25. UCC § 9-104, Comment 7; see Coogan, Relationship of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code to Pre-Code Chattel Security Law, 51 Va. L. Rev. 853, 855 & n.9 (1965).
26. UCC § 9-104(g) (emphasis added). Compare UCC § 9-104(g) (1972 version).
27. In re Levine, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 238, 242 (D. Conn. 1969); Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d
94, 96 (Me. 1968).
28. See 1 P. Coogan, W. Hogan & D. Vagts, Secured Transactions under the Uniform
Commercial Code § 3A.03[c], at 207 (1976); R. Henson, Secured Transactions § 6-8. at 150-51
(1973); Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 477, 518 (1973); Henson, Insurance
Proceeds as "Proceeds" under Article 9, 18 Cath. U.L. Rev. 453, 456 (1969).
29. 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976).
30. Id. at 60. The court further stated that section 9-104(g) "would be triggered in cases where
a debtor uses his life insurance policy as a means for securing a debt owed to the insurer. In
contrast, there is no basis for concluding that the statutory exclusion was intended to extend to
security agreements which both create a direct security interest in inventory andfor equipment
and require the debtor to provide his creditor with further protection by insuring the collateral."
Id.
31. UCC § 9-104, Comment 7 states: "Rights under life insurance and other policies, and
deposit accounts, are often put up as collateral. Such transactions are often quite special, do not
fit easily under a general commercial statute and are adequately covered by existing law." See
also 1 G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property § 10.7, at 315 (1965).
32. Cf. Domain Indus., Inc. v. First Security Bank & Trust Co., 230 N.W.2d 165 (Iowa
1975) (UCC § 9-104(k) held not to exclude security interest in bank account which contained
"proceeds" from the coverage of article 9).
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artistically phrased, this argument proves too much; bank deposits are not generally
within Article 9 either, but clearly bank deposits can constitute 9-306 proceeds."

The more reasonable construction would seem to be to limit the insurance
exclusion of section 9-104(g) to actual transfers of interest. Thus, courts have
correctly construed this subsection to exclude from the coverage of article 9

assignments of the debtor's interest in insurance payments after a loss had
occurred. 34 This does not mean that section 9-104(g) should be held to bar a
continuing security interest in those payments as "proceeds." This analysis is
consistent with the policy of the UCC to protect transactions which attempt to
create a security interest. 35 Since the security agreement will normally provide
that the secured party is entitled to the insurance proceeds, this construction
would also tend to effectuate the intention of the parties.
B.

The Requirement of a Voluntary Disposition of the Collateral

Courts 36 found a second obstacle to the creation of a security interest in7
insurance proceeds in the somewhat ambiguous language of section 9-306(1).3
This subsection defines "proceeds" to include "whatever is received when
collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed of.
. . ."38 The first courts to consider the problem interpreted the words "otherwise disposed of' to refer only to a voluntary disposition of the collateral by

the debtor and not to the involuntarily caused damage or destruction which
gives rise to an insurance fund.3 9 Thus, in Quigley v. Caron,4 0 where the
collateral was destroyed by fire, the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine held:
The insurance monies plainly do not come from a sale or exchange or collection of
the security.
[Was the collateral] "otherwise disposed of"? We answer in the negative. In our
view, the Code covers voluntary disposal and not a change from destruction by fire. 4
33.

1 P. Coogan, W. Hogan & D. Vagts, Secured Transactions under the Uniform Commer-

cial Code § 3A.03[c], at 207 (1976) (footnote omitted); Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 Harv.
L. Rev. 477, 518 (1973) (footnote omitted).

34.

National Bedding & Furniture Indus., Inc. v. Clark, 252 Ark. 780, 782, 481 S.W.2d 690,

691 (1972); Charles Constr. Co. v. Leisure Resources, Inc., 307 N.E.2d 336, 338 n.2 (Mass. App.

1974); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 295, 222 A.2d 571,
575-76 (1966).
35. See UCC § 9-102(1)(a) which provides that article 9 applies "to any transaction (regardless

of its form) which is intended to create a security interest in personal property or fixtures
including ... contract rights.. . ." UCC § 9-201 states in part: "Except as otherwise provided by
this Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against
purchasers of the collateral and against creditors."
36. In re Hix, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 925, 927 (S.D. Ohio 1969); In re Levine, 6 UCC Rep. Serv
238, 241 (D. Conn. 1969); Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94, 96 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 294, 222 A.2d 571, 575 (1966); cf. Hoffman v.
Snack, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 145, 147 (C.P. 1964).
37. UCC § 9-306(1). Compare UCC § 9-306(1) (1972 version).

38.

UCC § 9-306(1).

39.
40.
41.

See cases cited in note 21 supra.
247 A.2d 94 (Me. 1968).
Id. at 96. In Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 222
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While this argument might be convincing in a grammatical sense, it is too

narrow an interpretation of the Code. 4 2 There appears to be no meaningful
reason for distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary dispositions for
the purposes of section 9-306. Furthermore, the distinction may lead to
illogical results, especially since section 9-306(2) provides:
Except where this Article otherwise provides, a security interest continues in
collateral notwithstanding sale, exchange or other disposition thereof by the debtor
unless his action was authorized by the secured party in the security agreement or
otherwise, and also continues
in any identifiable proceeds including collections re43
ceived by the debtor.

If the "other disposition" in the above subsection refers only to a voluntary
transfer, then, under the hypothetical previously discussed, 44 a secured party's perfected security interest in the debtor's "proceeds" would be defeated if
Debtor accidently wrecked the tractor, but would continue were he to wreck
it intentionally. 4 5 Furthermore, the subsection provides that the security
interest continues not only in the collateral but in "any identifiable proceeds"
thereof. There is no reason why insurance proceeds can not be "identifiable"
proceeds. Nevertheless, the narrow interpretation found further support in
A.2d 571 (1966), the collateral, a 1964 Diamond T tractor, was destroyed in an accident. The
court stated- "We do not believe that the disposition referred to in this section [9-3061l)] can be
construed to describe the demolition of the 1964 Diamond T and the subsequent compensation
paid for its loss. This involuntary conversion of the tractor is not a disposition within the meaning
of this particular provision of the code.
...What we believe to be controlling is the fact that the mishap whereby the 1964 Diamond T
tractor was completely destroyed is not a disposition within the meaning of the code." Id. at
294-95, 222 A.2d at 575.
42. In re Hunter, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 928 (S.D. Ohio 1971), was the first case to recognize this.
Hunter involved an insured automobile which was subject to a perfected security interest- The
security agreement obligated the debtor to insure the collateral " 'with loss payable clauses in
favor of the secured party as its interest may appear.' " Id. at 929. The automobile was
subsequently destroyed in an accident. In allowing the secured party to reach the insurance
proceeds over the claim of the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy, the court held: "To read a question
of intent, fault, or voluntariness into the statute for the purpose of defeating a security interest
would serve only to rely on concepts or legal fictions that do violence to both ordinary semantics
and practices in the market place. If one looks at the intent, then a debtor who deliberately
wrecked his car would not defeat the secured party's interest, but one who suffered an accident
beyond his control would. In either event, the collateral has been 'disposed of.' This court is
unable to perceive any purpose in striking down a security interest and collateral clearly
anticipated by the parties when they agreed specifically to carry insurance for such a loss or
disposition of collateral as here involved." Id. at 930; see R. Henson. Secured Transactions § 6-8,
at 148 (1973); Boroff, Insurance Proceeds under Section 9-306: Before and After, 79 Com. L.J.
442, 444 (1974); Gillombardo, The Treatment of Uniform Commercial Code Proceeds in
Bankruptcy: A Proposed Redraft of Section 9-306, 38 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1. 3-4 (1969); Henson,
Insurance Proceeds as "Proceeds" under Article 9, 1S Cath. U.L. Rev. 453, 453-54 (1969)
43. UCC § 9-306(2).
44. See notes 10-15 supra and accompanying text.
45. In re Hunter, 9 UCC Rep. Serv. 928, 930 (S.D. Ohio 1971); see the discussion of this case
in note 42 supra.
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Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. PrudentialInvestment Corp.46 In that case,
collateral which secured the debtor's obligation to the secured party was a
1964 Diamond T tractor. 4 7 The tractor was completely destroyed in an
accident and the secured party attempted to reach the insurance fund as
"proceeds" of the collateral over the claim of an assignee of the debtor's interest
in the insurance policy. The Rhode Island Supreme Court held for the
assignee in part on the ground that "the mishap [which the court characterized as an involuntary conversion] whereby the 1964 Diamond T tractor
was completely destroyed is not a disposition within the meaning of the
code. ' 48 Thus, under Universal C.I.T., if the debtor had intentionally
wrecked his tractor, the secured party's security interest would have continued in the insurance proceeds pursuant to section 9-306. Such a distinction
appears arbitrary and unreasonable. Whether the disposition is voluntary or
involuntary, 49 as a practical matter the collateral has been disposed of.3 0
C. The "Personal Contract" Argument
5

Courts found a third reason to exclude insurance payments from the
section 9-306(1) definition of "proceeds" in the traditional holding that an
insurance contract is a "personal contract" 2 between insurer and insured
which does not "run" with the insured collateral. 53 Thus, a secured party
could claim no interest in the insurance fund merely by virtue of his security
46. 101 R.I. 287, 222 A.2d 571 (1966), noted in 19 Ala. L. Rev. 565 (1967); 52 Iowa L. Rev.
1219 (1967); 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1514 (1967).
47. The debtor obtained the 1964 tractor by trading in an older tractor which had been the
original collateral securing the debt.
48. 101 R.I. at 294-295, 222 A.2d at 575; see note 41 supra.
49. One commentator has suggested that if the collateral were destroyed or stolen by a third
party, the secured party's security interest would continue in it under § 9-306(2) and has called
this result "self-evidently correct" despite the language of the Code. R. Henson, Secured
Transactions § 6-8, at 148 (1973); Henson, Insurance Proceeds as "Proceeds" under Article 9, 18
Cath. U.L. Rev. 453, 454 (1969). It would also seem clear that the secured party should be
entitled to the insurance proceeds even in such a situation under UCC § 9-306(1). Such would
certainly be the result under UCC § 9-306(1) (1972 version); see notes 58-66 infra and accompanying text.
50. Obviously, the economic consequences are identical whether the collateral is damaged or
destroyed voluntarily, involuntarily or through the actions of a third party.
51. In re Levine, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 238, 241 (D. Conn. 1969); National Bedding & Furniture
Indus., Inc. v. Clark, 252 Ark. 780, 790, 481 S.W.2d 690, 695 (1972); Quigley v. Caron, 247
A.2d 94, 95-96 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.1. 287,
292-93, 222 A.2d 571, 574-75 (1966); Distributor's Warehouse, Inc. v. Madison Auto Parts &
Serv. Corp., 8 UCC Rep. Serv. 569, 573 (Wisc. Cir. Ct. 1970).
52. Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 292, 222 A.2d 571,
574 (1966). See, e.g., Cromwell v. Brooklyn Fire Ins. Co., 44 N.Y. 42, 47 (1870); Galante v.
Hathaway Bakeries, Inc., 6 App. Div. 2d 142, 149, 176 N.Y.S.2d 87, 94 (4th Dep't 1958); Rath
v. Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, 205 Misc. 135, 140, 127 N.Y.S.2d 231, 236 (Sup. Ct.
1953).
53. 101 R.I. at 292, 222 A.2d at 574.
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interest. In Universal C.I.T., the court took the following approach to the
problem:
"Proceeds" by definition under the code arises from either a sale, exchange,
collection or other dispositon of either the collateral or proceeds. Insurance moneys or
proceeds, however, arise and are paid as the result of a contract. An insurance
contract or policy, so called, pertains to the persons to the contract and not to the item
insured.5 It
is a personal contract which does not attach to or run with the property
4
insured.
This approach appears to be objectionable on several grounds. First, other
personal contract rights may serve as either collateral or "proceeds" under the
Code. 5 5 Second, once the insurer's liability has been ascertained, it is irrelevant whether payment is given to the secured party or debtor. And, third, the
amount of the payments will usually be determined by the value of the
insured property. Such payments stand in the place of the collateral as do any
other "proceeds." Thus, where the security agreement covers "proceeds" and
the insurance on the collateral is made payable to the debtor (or, a fortiori, to
the secured party),5 6 the secured party should be entitled to the proceeds. As
Professor Henson has pointed out, there is simply "no reason for general
creditors to get a windfall in the form of insurance proceeds when they would
have had no claim on the collateral had it not been destroyed.""

54. Id. The court in In re Levine, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 238 (D. Conn. 1969), also adopted this
approach by holding that the secured party's perfected security interest in the "proceeds" of the
debtor's inventory gave it no security interest in the compensation paid under a fire insurance
policy when the inventory was destroyed. "[Tlhe insurance moneys flow from the personal
contract of insurance and are not proceeds that come from the property insured." Id. at 241,
55. UCC § 9-102(1)(a). "'Contract right' means any right to payment under a contract not yet
earned by performance and not evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper." UCC § 9-106.
56. The situation is, of course, different where the insurance is made payable to a third party.
The 1972 amendments to article 9 provide only that "[ilnsurance payable by reason of loss or
damage to the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable to a person other than
a party to the security agreement." UCC § 9-306(1) (1972 version). According to the drafters,
"[tihe 'except' clause is intended to say that if the insurance contract specifies the person to whom
the insurance is payable, the concept of 'proceeds' will not interfere with performance of the
contract." UCC § 9-306(1), Reasons for 1972 Change. The revisions would thus affirm the result
in Distributor's Warehouse, Inc. v. Madison Auto Parts & Serv. Corp., 8 UCC Rep. Scrv. 569
(Visc. Cir. Ct. 1970). In that case, the collateral was covered by a pre-Code chattel mortgage.
The mortgage note provided that the debtor agreed to insure the collateral in a manner
satisfactory to the mortgagee. An insurance policy was taken out with the mortgagee named as
loss-payee. When the collateral was destroyed by fire, other creditors with liens against the
insured property claimed the insurance proceeds. The court held that the mortgagee was entitled
to the insurance fund on the ground that "[a] policy of fire insurance is a personal contract which
does not attach to the property insured." Id. at 373. The revised section 9-3061) would render the
personal contract approach taken by the court unnecessary.
57. Henson, Insurance Proceeds as "Proceeds" under Article 9, 18 Cath. U.L. Rev. 453, 461
(1969).
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TO ARTICLE 9

8

In response" to the decisions holding that insurance proceeds are not
"proceeds" within the Code's protection, 9 the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws amended both sections 9-104(g) and
9-306(1). Section 9-104(g) now provides that article 9 does not apply "to a
transfer of an interest in or claim in or under any policy of insurance, except
as provided with respect to proceeds (Section 9-306) and priorities in proceeds
(Section 9-312) .... -60 The revisions thus clearly dispose of the insurance
exclusion problem. 6 1 The amended section 9-306(1) now provides:
"Proceeds" includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other
disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to
the collateral is proceeds, except to the extent that it is payable to a person other than a
party to the security agreement .... 62
The reason for the new, explicit provision on insurance proceeds is "to
overrule various cases to the effect that proceeds of insurance on collateral are
not proceeds of the collateral. ' 63 One commentator has termed the inclusion
of insurance as "proceeds" in the revised Code "a remarkable deviation from
the sponsors' habitual policy of not making amendments where the only
64
purpose would be to overrule bad cases."
The revisions conclusively indicate the drafter's original intent to include
58. According to the drafters, "[t]he new second sentence of subsection (1)is intended to
overrule various cases to the effect that proceeds of insurance on collateral are not proceeds of tie
collateral." UCC § 9-306, Reasons for 1972 Change.
59. E.g., In re Levine, 6 UCC Rep. Serv. 238 (D. Conn. 1969); Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d
94 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 222 A.2d
571 (1966).
60. UCC § 9-104(g) (1972 version) (emphasis added).
61. See notes 25-35 supra and accompanying text.
62. UCC § 9-306(1) (1972 version) (emphasis added). To date 15 states have adopted the 1972
amendments to the UCC. See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 44-3101 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Ark.
Stat. Ann. §§ 85-9-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Cal. Comm. Code §§ 9101 et seq. (West Supp. 1976),
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 26, §§ 9-101 et seq. (Smith-Hurd 1974); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 554.9101 et seq.
(Cum. Pamphlet 1976); Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 84-9-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Law of April 3, 1976,
ch. 135, §§ 1 et seq., [1976] Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 259; Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 104.9101 et seq.
(1975); Law of June 26, 1975, ch. 862, §§ I et seq., [1975] N.C. Sess. Law 1228; N.D. Cent.
Code §§ 41-09-02 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 79.1010 et seq. (1975); Tex. Code Bus.
& Com. Ann. §§ 9.101 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Va. Code Ann. §§ 8.9-101 et seq. (Supp. 1976); W.
Va. Code Ann. §§ 46-9-101 et seq. (Supp. 1975); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 409.101 et seq. (Supp. 1975).
63. UCC § 9-306, Reasons for 1972 Change. The official commentary to § 9-306 states the
intended effect of the change: "It makes clear that insurance proceeds from casualty loss of
collateral are proceeds within the meaning of this section." UCC § 9-306 (1972 version), Comment
1. This language lends support to the argument that insurance proceeds of collateral were not
intended to be excluded from the original definition of "proceeds" in the 1962 version of the Code.
The new second sentence of § 9-306(1) should thus be viewed as a clarification rather than as a
substantive change in the law; accord, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58,
61 (2d Cir. 1976).
64. Ayer, The New Article 9 and the California Commercial Code, 21 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 937,
961-62 (1974).
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insurance as "proceeds" and clearly dispose of the "personal contract" argument 65 and the requirement of a voluntary disposition 66 as far as insurance
payments are concerned. Insurance, however, is not the only source of funds
arising from an involuntary disposition of collateral or proceeds. 67 In Hoffman
v. Snack, 68 the assignee of a financing agreement which had given the secured
party a security interest in the debtor's automobile, was denied the right to
intervene in a trespass action brought by the debtor against a third party who
had been involved in an accident which resulted in the total destruction of the
debtor's automobile. The court held that section 9-306(2) could not be
extended to include cases where the collateral has not been transferred, but
has simply depreciated or been destroyed without fault of the debtor. 69 Thus,
the assignee's security interest in "proceeds" could not include any sum that
the debtor might recover from the third party tortfeasor. 70 This result
seemingly would be affirmed under the revisions since the 1972 amendments
do not change the definition of "proceeds"' 1 in the first sentence of section
9-306(1) to include
funds arising from the involuntary disposition of collateral
' 72
or "proceeds.

65. See notes 51-57 supra and accompanying text.
66. See notes 36-50 supra and accompanying text.
67. In In re Continental Trucking, Inc., 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 5-6 tM.D. Fla. 1974), it was
held that where a secured party had a valid security interest in a truck owned by the debtor, a
check in payment of a judgment for breach of warranty which the debtor had obtained from the
truck's manufacturer was not "proceeds" of the collateral since the debtor's suit on the breach of
warranty claim was not a "disposition" of the collateral within the meaning of UCC § 9-306. Id.
at 529-30; see 9 UCC Law Letter 3 (T. Quinn ed. Sept. 1975). In Continental Trucking, supra,
there was no voluntariness problem, since the debtor willingly brought suit against the manufacturer. The court, however, simply refused to regard the debtor's commencement of its suit as a
"disposition" of the collateral. The revisions would seem to affirm this result.
68. 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 145 (C.P. 1964).
69. Id. at 147.
70. UCC § 9-104(k) (1972 version) excludes "a transfer in whole or in part of any claim arising
out of tort" from the coverage of article 9. This subsection could be read as excluding
non-insurance payments arising from the involuntary dispositon of collateral from the definition
of "proceeds" in § 9-306(1). While it is true that in making a loan a secured party is far less likely
to rely on the fortuitousness of succeeding to a tort claim than on the debtor's insurance, it is
nevertheless difficult to justify a distinction between the two sources of funds. Monies resulting
from a tort claim like the one in Hoffman would appear to be in every sense analogous to monies
arising from an insurance claim on damaged or destroyed collateral. In either case the fund is
paid to replace the collateral and stands in its place. See R. Henson, Secured Transactions § 6-8.
at 154 (1973); Boroff, Insurance Proceeds under Section 9-306: Before and After, 79 Com. L.J.
442, 444 (1974); Dawson, The 1972 Amendments to Article Nine of the Uniform Commercial
Code: Attachment and Enforceability, Future Advances, and Proceeds, 54 Ore L Rev 251, 273
n.104 (1975); Hawkland, The Proposed Amendments to Article 9 of the UCC, Part II: Proceeds.
77 Com. L.J. 12, 13 (1972); Henson, Insurance Proceeds as "Proceeds" under Article 9, 18 Cath.
U.L. Rev. 453, 459 (1969).
71. Only stylistic changes were made in the first sentence of UCC § 9-30611) The drafters
have indicated that "[tlhe first sentence of subsection (1) is rewritten for clarity." UCC § 9-306(1).
Reasons for 1972 Change.
72. However, it is at least arguable that such a result would be too narrow an application of
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Another problem may lie latent in the language of revised section 9-306(1).

While the first sentence of that subsection provides that" '[piroceeds' includes
whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of

collateral or proceeds,"'7 3 its second sentence states only that "[iJnsurance
payable by reason of loss or damage to the collateral is proceeds .

.

.

",14

The

amended subsection does not state that insurance payable by reason of loss or
damage to "proceeds" of the orfginal collateral is "proceeds." This has led one

writer 75 to the conclusion that the result in Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v.

Prudential Investment Corp.,7 6 might not be reversed by the 1972 amendments. 77 For, in Universal C.I.T., the destroyed tractor which gave rise to the
insurance fund was not the original collateral, but a new tractor in part
payment for which the debtor had traded in the original collateral. Thus,
according to this writer, the insurance monies in Universal C.I.T. were paid
in compensation for the destruction, not of the original collateral, but of its
"identifiable proceeds.17 8 This situation is not expressly covered by section
9-306(1). The exclusion may have been inadvertent, but if not, it is indeed
difficult to grasp the logic behind the distinction between insurance on
collateral and insurance on "proceeds." It should be noted, however, that
when the secured party in Universal C.I.T. discovered that the debtor had
traded in the original collateral, it had him execute a second financing
statement which covered the new tractor and also covered "proceeds.""7
the Code. There is no apparent reason why the term "disposition" cannot encompass "involuntary" as well as "voluntary" dispositions.
73. UCC § 9-306(1) (1972 version) (emphasis added).
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Boroff, Insurance Proceeds under Section 9-306: Before and After, 79 Com. L.J. 442
(1974).
76.
101 R.I. 287, 222 A.2d 571 (1966).
77. Boroff, Insurance Proceeds under Section 9-306: Before and After, 79 Com. L.J. 442, 444
(1974). Boroff suggests that § 9-306(1) be amended to read " '[plroceeds' includes whatever Is
received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other voluntary or involuntary disposition of
collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of loss or damage to the collateral or proceeds
is proceeds ....
" Id. at 445 (italics omitted). This would dispose of both the voluntary transfer
and insurance on "proceeds" problems under the revisions.
78. UCC § 9-306(2).
79.
101 R.I. at 290, 222 A.2d at 573. It should be noted that under the 1972 amendments
"proceeds" will be covered unless the security agreement specifically excludes them. Thus It will
no longer be necessary to check a "proceeds box" on the financing statement to assure perfection
of the security interest as to "proceeds." UCC § 9-203(3) (1972 version); UCC § 9-306(3) (1972
version). However, unless the "proceeds" are of a kind in which a security interest may be
perfected by filing in the same office(s) where the original financing statement was filed, the
security interest in those "proceeds" becomes unperfected ten days after the "proceeds" are
received by the debtor (unless the "proceeds" are "identifiable cash proceeds" or the security
interest in the "proceeds" is perfected before the ten-day period expires). UCC § 9-306(3) (1972
version). One commentator has suggested that since insurance proceeds will almost always be
"cash proceeds," a filed financing statement covering the collateral alone will automatically
extend to any insurance proceeds under UCC § 9-306(3)(b) (1972 version). Clark, The New UCC
Article 9 Amendments, 44 J. Kan. B. Ass'n 131, 172 (1975). Professor Henson has pointed out,
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Therefore, under revised section 9-306(1), the secured party's continuing
security interest in "proceeds" would have extended to the insurance fund
after all.
IV. IS A CONTINUOUSLY PERFECTED SECURITY INTEREST IN "PROCEEDS"
PRIOR IN RIGHT TO A SUBSEQUENTLY FILED FEDERAL TAx LIEN?
Even if a secured party's security interest in "proceeds" can extend to
insurance payments under both the 1962 and revised versions of the Code, the
question remains whether such an interest can prevail against a claim based
on a subsequently filed federal tax lien. A brief introduction to federal tax lien
law is necessary to an understanding of this question.
The relative priority of the federal tax lien is an area of the law which is
both complex and fraught with uncertainty. It is an area where the pronouncements of all but the highest court in the land have time and again
proven unsafe to rely upon. 0 It must thus be kept in mind that the
labyrinthian complexity of federal tax lien law renders it difficult to predict
accurately how the courts will decide questions which arise at the fringes of
the law.
A federal tax lien arises at the time the tax is assessed."' Assessment is the
entry of the amount of the taxpayer's liability on the dockets of the Internal
Revenue Service. 82 Since assessment is a non-public, administrative act, the
existence of the lien may be unknown to either the taxpayer or his creditors.
The lien will continue to encumber both the presently-owned and afteracquired 83 non-exempt 84 property of the taxpayer until the tax liability "is
satisfied or becomes unenforceable by reason of lapse of time." 8 It was early held that the priority of the federal tax lien is governed by the
however, that insurance proceeds ordinarily appear in the form of a draft in which an interest can
only be perfected by taking possession. UCC § 9-304(l). Thus, according to Professor Henson, the

secured party will, as a practical matter, have to arrange to be named as loss-payee on the policy
or he will lose his interest in the insurance proceeds unless: (1)the secured party gets possession of
the draft within the ten day period; (2) the draft is deposited in a special account or retained as
such; or (3) the draft is transformed into the same kind of property as the original collateral or
into "identifiable cash proceeds" before the ten day period has expired. Henson, Some "Proceeds" and Priority Problems under Revised Article 9, 12 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 750, 757 n.24
(1971).
80. Some of the cases reversed are listed in Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The
Campaign of the Federal Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 724, 729 n.23
(1965).
81. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6322. The lien arises by force of § 6321 which provides: "If any
person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the amount...

[with interest, penalty and costs] . . . shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon all
property and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to such person." Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 6321.
82. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6203.
83. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265, 267 (1945).
84. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6334.
85. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6322.
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familiar common law rule that the "first in time is the first in right. '8 6 It was
nevertheless also held that to take priority over a federal tax lien, a competing
lien had to be "choate" before the federal lien arose. 87 In order for a
'
competing lien to be considered choate or "specific" and "perfected, " 88
the
amount of the lien, the identity of the8 9lienor and the property subject to the
lien had to be definitely established.
The Supreme Court soon developed these requirements to the point where
few competing liens could prevail against a subsequent federal tax lien. 90
Thus, in United States v. PioneerAmerican Insurance Co., 91 a mortgagee's
claim for an attorney's fee was held inchoate and subordinate to filed federal
tax liens even though the tax liens were filed after the mortgage was recorded,
after the mortgagor had defaulted and after the foreclosure suit was instituted. Notice of the liens was, however, filed prior to the entry of judgment
on the mortgagee's claim. Therefore, since the precise amount of the claim
could not be established
until the entry of judgment, the mortgagee's lien was
92
deemed inchoate.
86. See Rankin v. Scott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 177, 179 (1827), where Chief Justice Marshall
stated: "The principle is believed to be universal, that a prior lien gives a prior claim, which is
entitled to prior satisfacton . .. .

87. E.g., United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84, 88 (1963); United States v. City
of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954).
88. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 84 (1954). The choate lien doctrine Is
well summarized by the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Continental Fin., Inc. v. Cambridge
Lee Metal Co., 56 N.J. 148, 265 A.2d 536 (1970). "Under that doctrine, a recorded federal lien,
though subordinate to an earlier 'specific and perfected' state lien, takes priority over any
so-called inchoate lien which is not specific and perfected. The state lien is said to be specific and
perfected (or choate) when 'there is nothing more to be done-when the identity of the lienor, the
property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are established.' " Id. at 151, 265 A.2d at
537. Whether or not a competing lien is choate is, of course, a question of federal law. United
States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 49-50 (1950).
89. 346 U.S. at 84.
90. United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (per curiam) (subcontractor's
assignment of all sums to become due for performance of his subcontract to a surety as security
for any indebtedness he might incur to the surety held inchoate and subordinate to a federal tax
lien which attached after the assignment was made); United States v. White Bear Brewing Co.,
350 U.S. 1010 (1956) (per curiam) (mechanic's lien which was specific, prior in time and being
enforced before the federal tax lien arose held inchoate even though everything possible under
state law had been done to perfect it, because it was not yet reduced to a final judgment).
Decisions favoring the federal lien were poignantly criticized by the commentators; see, e.g.,
Cross, Federal Tax Claims: Nature and Effect of the Government's Weapons for Collection, 27
Fordham L. Rev. 1 (1958); Kennedy, From Spokane County to Vermont: The Campaign of the
Federal Government Against the Inchoate Lien, 50 Iowa L. Rev. 724 (1965); Kennedy, The
Relative Priority of the Federal Government: The Pernicious Career of the Inchoate and General
Lien, 63 Yale L.J. 905 (1954); McNally, Federal Tax Lien Priority: An Injustice to Creditors, 14
Hastings L.J. 52 (1962); Shanks, The Tax Lien Tamed, 8 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 339 (1961); Wolson,
Federal Tax Liens--A Study in Confusion and Confiscation, 43 Marq. L. Rev. 180 (1959).
91. 374 U.S. 84 (1963).
92. Id. at 90-91.
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The harsh nature of the choateness doctrine was, however, somewhat
mitigated by the adoption of the so called "no property" rule. Since the federal
93
tax lien can only attach to "property and rights to property... belonging"
to the taxpayer and since the extent of the taxpayer's property interest is
determined by state law, 94 where the applicable state law declares that the
taxpayer has no rights in the property, there is "no property" to which the
federal lien can attach. Thus in Aquilino v. United States,9s it was held that a
federal tax lien could not attach to money due a taxpayer-general contractor
under its construction contract with the owner, until a determination had
been made by the state court whether or not the general contractor had a
property interest in the sums due to the extent that its subcontractors
96
remained unpaid.
While such an attitude was generally applauded by the bar, the "choateness" doctrine still posed formidable barriers to competing lien creditors and a
"crescendo of criticism" arose calling for reform.
In 1966, therefore, Congress undertook a comprehensive revision of "the
internal revenue laws concerned with the relationship of Federal tax liens to
the interests of other creditors"97 which culminated in the enactment of the
93. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6321.
94. Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 512-13 (1960).
95. 363 U.S. 509 (1960).
96. Id. at 515-16. On remand, the New York Court of Appeals held that under New York
law, a taxpayer-general contractor had no property interest in money due it from the owner under
a construction contract with the owner to the extent that the taxpayer's subcontractors remained
unpaid. Aquilino v. United States, 10 N.Y.2d 271, 282, 176 N.E.2d 826, 832, 219 N.Y.S.2d 254,
262 (1961); accord, United States v. Durham Lumber Co., 363 U.S. 522 (1960) (same under
North Carolina law); United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51 (1958) (federal tax lien cannot attach to
full insurance proceeds of a life insurance policy payable on taxpayer-beneficiary's death; it can
only attach to the cash surrender value since, under New Jersey law, beneficiary's property
interest extended only to the cash surrender value); In re Halprin, 280 F.2d 407 (3d Cir. 1960)
(bankrupt's unearned, conditional right to payment under a contract in existence when the federal
tax lien arose, did not constitute property of the bankrupt to which the federal lien could attach
where the bankrupt subsequently assigned such conditional right to a bank as security for a loan).
Simply stated, the doctrine means that the Government cannot take "Peter's property to pay
Paul's taxes." Creedon, Assignments for Security and Federal Tax Liens, 37 Fordham L. Rev.
535, 541 (1969).
The "no property" doctrine is clearly related to the choate lien doctrine. That is, where a
creditor's lien is choate in the federal sense it will often be true that the taxpayer-debtor has no
property rights under state law in the property subject to the lien. For in depth discussions of the
choateness and no property doctrines see I P. Coogan, W. Hogan, D. Vagts, Secured Transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code § 12.08 (1976); Babitt & Freiman, The Priority of
Federal Claims: Selected Problems and Theoretical Considerations, 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 521,
535-49 (1973); Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security Interests
Created under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1373-80 (1968); Creedon,
Assignments for Security and Federal Tax Liens, 37 Fordhan L. Rev. 535, 538-61 (1969);
Overman, Federal Tax Liens: A Guide to the Priority System of Section 6323 of the Internal
Revenue Code, 16 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 729, 731-38 (1975).
97. S.Rep. No. 1708, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Senate Report]; H.R.
Rep. No. 1884, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as House Report).
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Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 (FTLA). 98 A major objective of the act was "to
conform the lien provisions of the internal revenue laws to the concepts
developed in [the] Uniform Commercial Code." 99 The FTLA was also, in
part, an attempt to reform the choateness doctrine and thus to eliminate some
of the injustices to secured creditors and other competing lien holders which
the doctrine had created.' 0 0 The act substantially strengthened the rights of
private secured creditors against a competing federal tax lien.' 0'
Initially, it must be observed that the FTLA codified much of the choateness doctrine. 102 It would also seem clear, however, that it largely superseded
the doctrine as far as certain protected interests are concerned. The Senate
and House reports accompanying the bill which became the FTLA state:
This bill substantially improves the status of private secured creditors ...
[Viarious types of secured creditor interests already having, or given, priority status
over tax liens are specifically defined, and it is provided that where those interests
qualify under the definitions they are to be accorded this priority status whether or not
they are in all other respects definite and complete at the time notice of the tax lien is
filed. 03
98. Act of Nov. 2, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-719, § 101, 80 Stat. 1125 (codified in scattered
sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954). For detailed discussions of the FTLA see I P.
Coogan, W. Hogan, D. Vagts, Secured Transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code
§§ 12.01-.13 (1976); W. Plumb, Federal Tax Liens (3d ed. 1972); Babitt & Freiman, The Priority of
the Federal Claims: Selected Problems and Theoretical Considerations, 24 Case W. Res. L. Rev.
521 (1973); Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security Interests
Created under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369 (1968); Creedon,
Assignments for Security and Federal Tax Liens, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 535 (1969); Overman,
Federal Tax Liens: Guide to the Priority System of Section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code, 16
B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 729 (1975); Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities-Agenda for the Next
Decade (pts. 1-3), 77 Yale L.J. 228, 605, 1104 (1967-1968); Young, Priority of the Federal Tax
Lien, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 723 (1967).
99. Senate Report, supra note 97, at 2; House Report, supra note 97, at 1-2. For a very brief
outline of the Act showing some of the major changes from prior law see Phillips, Federal Tax
Liens and Secured Transactions: Accommodation or Abdication?, 10 Santa Clara Law. 30, 34
n.22 (1969).
100. See Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities--Agenda for the Next Decade, 77 Yale L.J.
228, 230 n.24, 232 (1967); Note, Choateness and the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act, 52 Minn. L.
Rev. 198, 204 (1967) (citing legislative history); 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1570, 1576-77 (1973).
101. Senate Report, supra note 97, at 2; House Report, supra note 97, at 2.
102. Nevada Rock & Sand Co. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 161, 168 (D. Nev. 1974);
Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security Interests Created under
the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1381 (1968). The House Report stated:
"Under decisions of the Supreme Court a mortgagee, pledgee or judgment creditor is protected at
the time notice of the tax lien is filed if the identity of the lienor, the property subject to the lien,
and the amount of the lien are all established at such time. . . .Except as otherwise provided,
subsection (a) of new section 6323 retains this basic rule of Federal law." House Report, supra
note 97, at 35. However, the Report adds that "[t]he holder of a security interest has priority over
a Federal tax lien if, at the time notice of the tax lien is filed, the security interest exists within the
meaning of section 6323(h)(1)." Id.
103. Senate Report, supra note 97, at 2; House Report, supra note 97, at 2.
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The question, then, is to what extent the choateness doctrine was superseded
by the enactment of the FTLA with regard to "security interests." It is
submitted that the FTLA clearly rendered the choateness requirements inapplicable to such interests."°
Section 6323(a) provides that a federal tax lien is not valid as against any
"holder of a security interest" until notice of the lien has been filed. 105 The
Internal Revenue Code's definition of "security interest" is found in section
6323(h)(1):
The term "security interest" means any interest in property acquired by contract for
the purpose of securing payment or performance of an obligation or indemnif)ing
against loss or liability. A security interest exists at any time (A)if, at such time, the
property is in existence and the interest has become protected under local law against a
104. Accord, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58, 61-63 (2d Cir. 1976)
(by implication); Nevada Rock & Sand Co. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 161, 169-70 tD. Nev.
1974); Centex Constr. Co. v. Kennedy, 332 F. Supp. 1213, 1215 (S.D. Tex. 1971); Coogan, The
Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security Interests Created under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1381 (1968); Creedon, Assignments for Security and
Federal Tax Liens, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 535, 569-70 (1969); Overman, Federal Tax Liens- A
Guide to the Priority System of Section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code, 16 B.C. Ind. & Com.
L. Rev. 729, 739 (1975); Plumb, Federal Liens and Priorities--Agenda for the Next Decade, 77
Yale L.J. 228, 232 (1967); Note, Choateness and the 1966 Federal Tax Lien Act, 52 Minn. L.
Rev. 198, 217 (1967); 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1570, 1576-78 (1973); see Adco Serv., Inc. v. Graphic
Color Plate, 137 N.J. Super. 39, 47, 347 A.2d 549, 553 (L. Div. 1975), quoting Nevada Rock &
Sand Co., supra. Contra, Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040, 1051-53 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973), criticized in 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1570, 1576-82 (1973);
United States v. Globe Corp., 113 Ariz. 44, -, 546 P.2d 11, 16 (1976) (en band). See also note
105 infra.
105. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(a) provides in pertinent part: "The lien imposed by
section 6321 shall not be valid as against any ... holder of a security interest ... until notice
thereof which meets the requirements of subsection (f) has been filed by the Secretary or his
delegate."
Prior to its amendment, the section had provided that "the lien imposed by section 6321 shall
not be valid as against any mortgagee, pledgee, purchaser, or judgment creditor until notice
thereof has been filed ... ." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, ch. 64, § 6323(a), 6SA Star. 779, as amended,
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(a). Despite this language, which would seem to dictate that the
specified interests would always take priority over a tax lien until filed, the Supreme Court held
that the interests were subordinate to a federal tax lien except to the extent that they were choate
as of the date the federal lien was filed. E.g., United States v. Pioneer Am. Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84
(1963); United States v. R.F. Ball Constr. Co., 355 U.S. 587 (1958) (per curiam). The reports
accompanying the FTLA, however, give an overwhelming indication that the choateness test is
not to be applied to the interests specified in the new section 6323(a) despite the fact that its
language is substantially similar to that of the prior provision. "The substitution of 'holder of a
security interest' for 'mortgagee' and 'pledgee' replaces the latter terms with a more general term
used in the Uniform Commercial Code. More important, however, it is intended that, under the
bill, the various types of interests defined in this provision are to have a priority over a nonfiled
Federal tax lien if they come within the definitions of these terms... whether or not in all other
regards they are definite and complete at the time notice of the tax lien is filed." Senate Report,
supra note 97, at 3-4 (footnote omitted); House Report, supra note 97, at 3-4 (footnote omitted).
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subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obligation, and (B) to the extent
that, at such time, the holder has parted with money or money's worth.'0 6
The House Report which accompanied the bill stated that "[t]he holder of a
security interest has priority over a Federal tax lien if, at the time notice of the
tax lien is filed, the security interest exists within the meaning of section
6323(h)(1).' 0 7 The FTLA thus provides a precise definitional framework
which, to a large extent, replaces the choateness requirements. If an interest
meets the definitional requirements of section 6323(h)(1), it is protected
against a subsequently filed tax lien regardless of whether the interest would
have been considered choate under the pre-1966 standard. 10 8
The chief difficulty is determining the scope of the phrase "the property is
in existence."' 1 9 It should first be noted that the FTLA's definition of a
0
security interest appears closely analogous to that of the UCC."1 The phrase
"protected . . . against a subsequent judgment lien"''' has substantially the
same meaning as protection against the UCC's "lien creditor." 112 Furthermore, under the UCC, a security interest cannot exist until the debtor has
rights in the collateral and the secured party has given value. 1 3 For this
reason, it has been suggested that the Internal Revenue Code's requirement
that the property be "in existence" is equivalent to the requirement that the
debtor have rights sin the collateral."14 If this is so, then there is no reason why
"contract rights"'I owned by the debtor at the time a security agreement is
executed, cannot be the subject of an effective security interest under the
106. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(h)(1) (emphasis added). Compare UCC § 1-201(37) (1972
version): " 'Security interest' means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures
payment or performance of an obligation."
107. House Report, supra note 97, at 35.
108. "Phrased differently, Congress has substituted its own definition of 'choate' In the area of
security interests." Nevada Rock & Sand Co. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 161, 170 (D. Nev.
1974).
109. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(h)(1)(A).
110. See note 106 supra. One court has even gone so far as to suggest that whatever "is
properly the subject matter of a 'security interest' under the Uniform Commercial Code would
also be property under the Tax Lien Act of 1966 ...." Centex Constr. Co. v. Kennedy, 332 F.
Supp. 1213, 1214 (S.D. Tex. 1971). See also Senate Report, supra note 97, at 3-4; House Report,
supra note 97, at 3-4.
111. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(h)(1)(A).
112. UCC § 9-301(3); see Nevada Rock & Sand Co. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 161, 169
(D. Nev. 1974); Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security Interests
Created under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1382-83 (1968).
113. UCC § 9-204(1); UCC § 9-203 (1972 version).
114. Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security Interests Created
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1383 (1968).
115. In the 1962 version of the UCC, a contract right is defined as "any right to payment
under a contract not yet earned by performance ...." UCC § 9-106. The 1972 amendments have
deleted the term. The concept is now included in the definition of "account." UCC § 9-106 (1972
version).
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FTLA.
Virtually all commentators'" 7 have agreed that contract rights can
be property which is "in existence" within the meaning of section 6323(h)(1)
and they are supported by some case authority." 8 Thus, a perfected security
interest in contract rights acquired by the debtor before the federal lien is filed
should take priority over the federal tax lien.
The "proceeds" question is not substantially more difficult. Assume that a
taxpayer-debtor enters into an agreement to secure a debt.1t 9 Secured Party
files a financing statement which also claims "proceeds.'" 2 0 A tax assessment
is then imposed against Taxpayer-Debtor, notice of which is properly filed. If
Taxpayer-Debtor subsequently sells part of the collateral and receives proceeds of the sale that are identifiable, it is beyond dispute that, as of the date
of the tax filing, Secured Party "had a security interest 'perfected' in [the]
UCC sense 1121 and 'in existence' in section 6323(h)(1) terminology in . . . [the]
proceeds. '122 It is of no importance that the "proceeds" were received by the
116. Contract rights are clearly protected under Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c)(2) as a kind
of "commercial financing security"; see House Report, supra note 97, at 42.
117. E.g., Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security Interests
Created under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1386-88 (1968); Creedon,
Assignments for Security and Federal Tax Liens, 37 Fordham L. Rev. 535, 561-65 (1969); 86
Harv. L. Rev. 1570, 1580 (1973).
118. The question was squarely faced in Centex Constr. Co. v. Kennedy, 332 F. Supp 1213
(S.D. Tex. 1971) (bank's security interest in contract rights is prior in right to a subsequently filed
federal tax lien). The court stated that" 'contract rights' constitute personal property which is in
existence, and effective so long as the lending agency is paying 'money or money's worth' If
protected by proper filing, a security interest in such property should have priority over a
subsequently filed Federal tax lien." Id. at 1215. For an interesting pre-FTLA case see Rockmore
v. Lehman, 129 F.2d 892 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 700 (1943). See also Hammes v.
Tucson Newspapers, Inc., 324 F.2d 101 (9th Cir. 1963) (assignment of rights to payment under
contract for sale of land held choate and prior in right to federal tax lien where assignment was
made before tax lien was filed but assigned payments fell due after date of filing). The court
stated: "The fact that the property subject to the lien is a present right to receive money in futuro
does not make the lien inchoate, at least where the right is unconditional." Id. at 103. Continental
Fin., Inc. v. Cambridge Lee Metal Co., 100 N.J. Super. 327, 241 A.2d 853 (L. Div. 1968), aff'd,
105 N.J. Super. 406, 252 A.2d 417 (App. Div. 1969) (per curiam), aff'd, 56 N.J. 148, 265 A.2d
536 (1970), is not to the contrary. While the superior court held for the government on the ground
that a security interest in a contract right is necessarily contingent and inchoate, the supreme
court found that there were no contract rights involved in the case and affirmed on the narrow
ground that there was no enforceable contract between the debtor and the third party obliging the
debtor to perform. 56 N.J. at 151-54, 265 A.2d at 537-39.
119. The hypothetical is suggested by Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of
1966 upon Security Interests Created under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev
1369, 1384-85 (1968).
120. Under the 1972 amendments to article 9, the financing statement need no longer claim
"proceeds"; see note 79 supra.
121. See UCC § 9-306.
122. Coogan, The Effect of the Federal Tax Lien Act of 1966 upon Security Interests Created
under the Uniform Commercial Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1369, 1384-85 (1968).
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debtor after the tax lien filing since virtually all forms of security must be
reduced to cash before they can be used to discharge the debt secured.123
Thus, it would appear that property protected by a section 6323(h)(1)
security interest need not always be in actual existence as of the date of the
tax lien filing, at least where such property is "proceeds" of the collateral
within the meaning of section 9-306 of the UCC. A contrary result was
reached in FederalInsurance Cb. v. Billy's Burgers, Inc. 124 The court held
that, although the secured party had a perfected security interest in the
original collateral and the proceeds of the insurance policy were assigned to it
in the security agreement, the secured party's interest in the proceeds did not
exist under section 6323(h)(1) until the insurance company admitted it owed
the money, which was subsequent to the date of the tax lien filing.' 2 The
government's tax lien was therefore prior in right to the secured party's
claim. 126
Two recent cases1 27 involving priority disputes in insurance funds between
secured creditors and the federal government have reached interesting results
on both the "proceeds" and priority questions. Both cases128were decided under
the FTLA and applied the 1962 version of the UCC.

Firemen's Fund American Insurance Co. v. Ken-Lori Knits, Inc., 129 involved a priority dispute between a secured party and the federal government
over the rights in an insurance fund payable by reason of the destruction of
the collateral by fire. The government's claim was based on various tax liens,
notices of which were filed subsequent to the perfection of the secured party's
security interest in the original collateral. The government, relying upon the
Universal C.I.T. and Quigley decisions, argued that the secured party's
123. Id. at 1385. Analytically this position presents at least one difficulty. Under the assumed
facts, Taxpayer-Debtor had no rights in the proceeds until after notice of the tax lien was filed. It
must be remembered, however, that a UCC security interest in "proceeds" is continuously
perfected as of the date the security interest in the original collateral was perfected; see UCC
§ 9-306(3). It has thus even been suggested that the Internal Revenue Code's "in existence"
requirement is equivalent to the UCC's definition of "perfection." Gamble, Secured Transactions:
The Perfected Security Interest Versus Competing Claims, 5 Cumberland-Samford L. Rev, 1, 18
(1974); cf. Donald v. Madison Indus., Inc., 483 F.2d 837, 845 (10th Cir. 1973).
124. 72 Civ. 1098 (S.D.N.Y., Feb. 16, 1973). Billy's Burgers was effectively overruled in
PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1976).
125. 72 Civ. 1098, at 8-9. The court appeared to assume, however, that the insurance
payments were "proceeds" (under N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-306 (McKinney 1964)) and that the choateness
doctrine is no longer applicable to security interests under the FTLA. Neither issue, however,
was even raised in the opinion.
126. 72 Civ. 1098, at 9.
127. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976); Firemen's Fund
Am. Ins. Co. v. Ken-Lori Knits, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 286 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
128. New York has not adopted the 1972 amendments. See N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-306(1)
(McKinney 1964). The revisions were introduced into the New York legislature on January 29,
1975 as S. 1794 and A. 2131, but have yet to be reported out of the Senate and Assembly
Judiciary Committees; see N.Y. Legis. Record and Index S 174, A 198 (1975).
129. 399 F. Supp. 286 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
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interest did not extend to the insurance proceeds under section 9-306(1).130 In
rejecting this argument the court distinguished Universal C.I.T. and Quigley
on the ground that in neither of those cases was the debtor obligated by the
security agreement to procure insurance for the protection of the secured
party.13 ' The court buttressed its holding by finding that since: (1) both
security agreements and the filed financing statements covered "proceeds"; (2)
a rider to the second agreement assigned all sums payable under the insurance
policy to the secured party as further security for its loan to the debtor; and (3)
the secured party was named as the loss-payee on the policy, the intention of
the parties that the secured party "have the status of a secured creditor with
regard to the insurance proceeds" was clearly manifested. 1 32 "While one of

these steps alone might not have been suffident," 133 their cumulative effect
was. Therefore, "[u]nder these34 circumstances, § 9-306(1) should be read to
include insurance proceeds."'
This holding raises some interesting questions. 3s The court was clearly
attempting to give effect to the express intention of the parties that the
secured party receive the insurance proceeds.' 36 But, in any event, the
intention of the parties to a particular security agreement is not relevant to the
question of whether, under the statute, insurance, payable by reason of loss or
damage to the collateral, can be "proceeds" of the collateral. If they are
"proceeds," it should make no difference that the secured party was named as
loss-payee on the policy, or was assignee of " 'all sums which may become
payable under such insurance' ,,137 as long as its original security interest
covered "proceeds" and was timely perfected. This is all that the Code
requires. But, under the holding of Firemen's Fund, both of these steps would
appear to be necessary to create a continuing security interest in insurance
as "proceeds." Furthermore, the opinion does not make clear when the secured party's security interest in the insurance fund came into "existence"
within the meaning of section 6323(h)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code so as to
take priority over a subsequently filed federal tax lien.138 The court merely
stated that the secured party's "lien became choate 0 391 at least at the date of
130.

Id. at 290; see N.Y. U.C.C. § 9-306(1) (McKinney 1964).

131.

399 F. Supp. at 290.

132. Id. at 290-91.
133. Id.at 290.
134. Id. at 291.
135. Although the point was not discussed, it is arguable that, since the secured party was
named as loss-payee on the policy and its claim exceeded the amount of the available insurance
fund, the debtor had "no property" interest in the insurance payments to which the federal tax
liens could attach.
136. See 399 F. Supp. at 290-91.
137. Id. at 290.
138. A precise resolution of this issue was unnecessary to the decision in the case since both
the fire which resulted in the destruction of the collateral and the perfection of the two security
agreements occurred prior to the federal government's filing of notice of its tax liens. Id. at 291.
139. Instead of interpreting the "in existence" requirement, the court in Firemen's Fund
applied the traditional "choateness" test to the secured party's earlier competing lien. It would
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14 0

the fire,"' and added that "[i]t may well have become choate when, with the
perfecting of the security agreement, [the secured party] obtained present
rights in the insurance policy
to receive payments in the future in the event of
4
damage to the property.'

'

The Second Circuit, in PPG Industries, Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance
Co., 142 took a step towards resolving some of these difficulties. Car Color,
Inc. (debtor), entered into a security agreement, dated September 28, 1970,
with PPG Industries, Inc. (secured party), which gave PPG a security interest
in all of Car Color's inventory and equipment, and in all "proceeds" of the
inventory. 143 The security agreement also provided that Car Color was to
insure both the inventory and equipment for the benefit of PPG, that in the
event of a loss the insurance company was to pay PPG directly, and that Car
Color assigned to PPG all rights to receive the proceeds of the insurance
policy. 144 This agreement was properly filed by PPG on October 8, 1970.
Car Color subsequently obtained a $25,000 insurance policy from the
Hartford Fire Insurance Company (Hartford), but the only named insured or
loss-payee on the policy was Car Color. On December 23, 1971, Car Color's
premises were destroyed by fire. When Hartford disclaimed liability, asserting
that the fire was caused by arson attributable to the insured, Car Color sued,
and, on April 25, 1973, obtained a $7,354.29 judgment retroactive to April 3,
1972, the date proof of loss had been submitted to the insurance company.
4The judgment covered "all losses" sustained as a result of the fire,1
apparently including some damage to tools and a wall. 14 6 On June 26, 1973,
PPG served Hartford with an execution of a default judgment in the amount
of $12,300.90 that it had obtained against Car Color on April 14, 1972.
Meanwhile, on December 10, 1971 and March 27, 1972, the United States
had imposed two tax assessments against Car Color for failure to pay its
federal withholding tax. Notice of the tax liens for these assessments, which
totaled $2,078.10, was properly filed by the government on May 4, 1972,
seem clear, however, that the choateness test has been superseded as far as security interests are
concerned by the passage of the FTLA. Thus, a security interest need not meet both the "in
existence" requirement and the choateness requirements to take priority over a subsequently filed
federal tax lien, but only the former; see notes 102-08 supra and accompanying text.
140. 399 F. Supp. at 291.
141. Id.; accord, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 1976).
142. 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976), aff'g 384 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
143. Joint Appendix at 61, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.
1976).
144. The security agreement provided in part: "Borrower [Car Color] will . . . keep the
Inventory and Equipment insured for the benefit of Secured Party [PPG] (to whom loss shall be
payable) and in such amount and with such companies and against such risks as may be
satisfactory to Secured Party; pay the cost of all such insurance; and deliver certificates
evidencing such insurance to Secured Party; and Borrower assigns to Secured Party all rights to
receive proceeds of such insurance, directs any insurer to pay all proceeds directly to Secured
Party, and authorizes Secured Party to endorse any draft for such proceeds ....
" Id.
145. 531 F.2d at 59.
146. See Joint Appendix at 130-31, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58
(2d Cir. 1976).
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subsequent to the fire, but147almost a year before Car Color obtained its
judgment against Hartford.
PPG Industries thus involved a priority dispute between the federal
government and PPG over who was entitled to first priority in the insurance
fund created when the debtor's premises were destroyed by fire. In affirming
the district court's decision, 148 the Second Circuit held that PPG had a valid
and continuing security interest in the insurance proceeds which satisfied the
"in existence" requirement of section 6323(h)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code
49
so as to take priority over the government's subsequently filed tax liens. 1
In response to the government's assertion that no security interest can be
created in insurance "proceeds," the court held that the UCC only excludes an
insurance policy as original collateral but not insurance payments as "pro147.

In chronological order, the events occurred as follows:

EVENT

DATE

a) PPG and Car Color execute security agreement

9128170

b) PPG files security agreement and financing statement

1018170

c) Car Color obtains fire insurance policy from Hartford with itself named
as loss-payee

12/10170

d) First tax assessment imposed

12110171

e) Fire at Car Color

12123171

f) Second tax assessment imposed
g) Car Color submits proof of loss to Hartford
h) PPG obtains default judgment against Car Color
i) Tax liens filed

3127172
413172
4114172
514172

j) Car Color obtains judgment against Hartford

412573

k) PPG serves Hartford with an execution of the prior default judgment

6126173

148. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 384 F. Supp. 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, S31
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976). The court discussed the Billy's Burgers decision (see text accompanying
notes 124-26 supra) at some length before concluding that "[tlhe instant case cannot be distinguished factually from Billy's Burgers. However, with all respect, this Court cannot agree with
the result reached there." 384 F. Supp. at 97 (italics omitted).
149. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

I 0

ceeds."'
Furthermore, it supported the district court's specific rejection of
the reasoning behind the prior decisions 5 ' which had held that insurance
could not be "proceeds" under section 9-306. 152 The Second Circuit went on
to state that, although the 1972 amendments to article 9 have not yet been
adopted by the New York legislature, 5 3 the revisions are "a persuasive
54
indication of the effect which § 9-306 was originally intended to have.'
And, "[s]ince no New York court has ruled on this question," 15 J the fact that
the state legislature had not yet enacted this amendment does not preclude a
federal court from rendering a decision which is consistent with the original
'
intention underlying § 9-306. 1156

PPG Industries thus appears to embrace the 1972 revisions as the present
law of New York. However, the liberality of its holding was somewhat

150.

Id. at 60; see notes 29-35 supra and accompanying text.

151. Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v. Prudential
Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 222 A.2d 571 (1966).
152. 531 F.2d at 61.
153. See note 128 supra.
154. 531 F.2d at 61 (emphasis added). This conclusion is supported by the official commentary
and by the official reasons for the 1972 change; see note 63 supra and accompanying text. The
holding would also seem to be correct as a matter of statutory construction. The Ninth Circuit, In
holding that government crop "abandonment payments" are "proceeds" within the meaning of
UCC § 9-306(1), stated that the broad definition of "proceeds" in that subsection indicates that
the word "is to be given a broad and flexible content." In re Munger, 495 F.2d 511, 513 (9th Cir.
1974). The court added that "[n]ot to include such payments within the term 'proceeds' would be
to raise distinctions of form over the realities underlying this financing transaction, a result
contrary to the intent of the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. This argument would appear
equally applicable to insurance payments. Furthermore, courts have recognized that they have a
responsibility to liberally construe the UCC to promote its underlying purposes and policies; see,
e.g., In re United Thrift Stores, Inc., 363 F.2d 11, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1966); National Shawmut Bank
v. Vera, 352 Mass. 11, 16, 223 N.E.2d 515, 518 (1967); Strevell-Paterson Fin. Co. v. May, 77
N.M. 331, 335, 422 P.2d 366, 369 (1967).
155. But cf. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 77 Misc. 2d 849, 355
N.Y.S.2d 78 (Dist. Ct. 1974). The secured party had a security interest in its debtor's automobile.
After the auto was wrecked by a driver insured by Allstate, the insurance company paid the
debtor's claim in the amount of $1,200. As part of the insurance settlement, the automobile
covered by the secured party's security interest was transferred by bill of sale to Allstate. The
insurance company, however, allowed the debtor to keep the car (which was a total loss). When
the debtor defaulted on his installment payments to the secured party, the latter sued Allstate (as
owner of the auto) for the unpaid balance. In holding for the secured party, the court found that
the insurance company was a buyer and since it was not a buyer in the ordinary course of
business it took subject to the secured party's interest by virtue of UCC § 9-201; see note 35
supra. The court does not mention proceeds but apparently assumes that insurance is proceeds
since the case rests on the theory that the secured party was entitled to the insurance payments by
virtue of its security interest and that Allstate, therefore, had an obligation to search the records
to establish whether someone other than the debtor was entitled to the insurance monies. See lB
P. Coogan, W. Hogan & D. Vagts, Secured Transactions under the Uniform Commercial Code
§ 24.10[1], at 2522 (Cum. Supp. 1976).
156. 531 F.2d at 61.

SECURITY INTERESTS

19761

diminished by the court's interesting dictum that the secured party might not
be entitled to the insurance as "proceeds"
where the debtor in the ordinary course of business takes out an insurance policy for
his own benefit. If the insurance policy is acquired in this manner and for this purpose,
there is no reason why the loss proceeds should be made available to a creditor with a
security interest in the debtor's inventory. By allowing him to recover the proceeds in
such a case, the secured creditor would be given a windfall simply because of the
happenstance existence of an insurance policy.' 5 7
The court thus states that if Car Color had not taken out the insurance policy
pursuant to the security agreement,15 8 PPG would not have been entitled to
the insurance fund as "proceeds" under section 9-306. Under the amended
section 9-306, this conclusion would seem to be erroneous and there appears
little reason why the result should be different under the 1962 version of the
Code. Insurance either is or is not "proceeds" of the collateral'- 9 and if
insurance is "proceeds," it should not matter what the debtor intends when it
takes out the policy.
A return to the simple hypothetical 160 suggested earlier may illustrate the
problem. In consideration of a loan from Secured Party, Debtor executes a
security agreement with Secured Party granting the latter a security interest in
Debtor's tractor. The financing statement is properly filed and all other
statutory requirements have been complied with. Debtor subsequently obtains
a valid insurance policy on the tractor. This tractor is later completely
destroyed in an accident. In jurisdictions which have adopted the 1972
amendments to article 9,161 the express language of section 9-306(1) would
appear to give Secured Party a perfected security interest in the insurance
proceeds regardless of what Debtor intended when it took out the insurance
policy, even in the absence of an express agreement to insure. In fact, Secured
Party would seem to be entitled to the insurance even if the Debtor had
obtained a policy on the tractor for its own benefit well before the security
agreement had been entered into. Nothing in the amended language of section
9-306(1), which provides only that "[i]nsurance payable by reason of loss or
damage to the collateral is proceeds" indicates that the debtor's intention in
obtaining the insurance policy is controlling on or even relevant to the
question of whether or not a particular insurance fund is "proceeds." Thus,
under the 1972 amendments, if the debtor has insured the collateral, the
157.

Id. at 63 n.7.

158. The court was "not entirely convinced that the insurance policy taken out by Car Color
was the specific one contemplated by the security agreement" but was "willing to accept the
district court's stated conclusion that ... the insurance obtained by Car Color was specifically
intended to be further security for PPG's lien." Id. This language is all the more curious since
PPG did not even attempt to argue that the policy had been obtained in compliance with the
security agreement; see Brief for Appellee at 5, PPG Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531
F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976).
159. See notes 136-37 supra and accompanying text.
160. See notes 10-15 supra and accompanying text.
161. See note 62 supra.
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secured party should be entitled to the insurance payments regardless of what
the debtor intended when obtaining the policy on the collateral. In PPG
Industries, however, the court seems to have been particularly influenced by
the parties' clearly expressed intention that the secured party receive the
insurance payments. 162 It may have overlooked the fact that a specific
agreement to insure would not seem to be necessary to give the secured party
rights in the insurance payments under the 1972 revisions. Thus, under the
holding of PPG Industries, while a loss-payee clause is no longer necessary,
an agreement to insure for the benefit of the secured party and an insurance
policy obtained pursuant to that agreement may well be. The Second Circuit,
therefore, appears not to have extended the 1972 amendments as far as the
drafters had intended.
There may be a second problem with the holding of PPG Industries.
Clearly, even under the 1972 amendments, a secured party with a continuing
security interest in "proceeds" is only entitled to that portion of an insurance
fund which arose from loss or damage to the secured collateral.163 It would
not be entitled to that portion of the insurance .payable by reason of damage to
any of the debtor's other property. 164 Thus, the insurance proceeds should be
traced to the collateral.
The tracing issue was not discussed in PPG Industries. PPG's security
interest in "proceeds" extended only to the proceeds of Car Color's inventory. 165 Nevertheless, the judgment recovered by Car Color against the
insurance company covered all of the losses which Car Color had sustained as
a result of the fire and apparently included compensation for some damage to
tools and a wall. 166 Even though PPG clearly was not entitled to any portion
of the fund not traceable to the destruction of Car Color's inventory, the
Second Circuit affirmed PPG's right to all of the available insurance monies.
In these circumstances, a remand to the district court in order to resolve the
67
tracing issue would have been more appropriate.
162. See 531 F.2d at 63 n.7.
163. See UCC § 9-306(1) (1972 version).
164. That is, property not covered by the security agreement.
165. See note 143 supra and accompanying text. The security agreement provided that
"Borrower hereby grants to Secured Party to secure all of Borrower's Liabilities a security interest
under the Uniform Commercial Code in the Inventory owned by Borrower at the date of this
agreement; the Inventory at any time hereafter acquired by Borrower: [sic] all proceeds of such
Inventory; and the Equipment which is used in Borrower's business, to secure the payment of all
liability or liabilities of Borrower to Secured Party ....
Joint Appendix at 61, PPG Indus., Inc.
v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976).
166. See notes 144-46 supra and accompanying text.
167. See Firemen's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Ken-Lori Knits, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 286, 292
(E.D.N.Y. 1975), discussed in notes 129-41 supra and accompanying text, where the court denied
summary judgment as to a portion of the insurance fund traceable to the loss of certain yarn
because it was not known precisely what portion of the yarn was owned by each of the two
corporate debtors. In Firemen's Fund, supra, this factual issue was held to be determinative of
the rights of the various competing claimants to the portion of the fund attributable to the loss of
the yarn. It may, as a practical matter, sometimes be difficult to accurately trace the insurance
proceeds directly to the secured collateral, but the difficulties do not appear insuperable.
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It is also apparent from the previous discussion of the choateness doctrine 168 that PPG's security interest in the insurance proceeds was not choate
under pre-FTLA standards as of either the date on which the federal tax liens
arose, 169 or the date on which they were filed,'

70

since the fund was not

created until later.' 7 ' Indeed, the insurance company was still disclaiming
liability as of the date on which notice of the liens was filed. Therefore, the
property subject to PPG's lien was by no means established, and thus, under
pre-1966 law, would have been deemed inchoate and subordinate to the
federal tax lien.' 72 Yet, in PPG Industries, the Second Circuit rejected the
choateness doctrine and instead applied only the definitional requirements for
a federally defined security interest contained in the Internal Revenue Code.
The district court had concluded its discussion of the "in existence" requirement of section 6323(h)(1) by holding that "the property which was the
subject matter of the security agreement (here, the inventory), was clearly in
existence, and ...the proceeds of the insurance are merely the collateral in
73
another form."
The Second Circuit, recognizing that priority conflicts involving federal tax
168.

See notes 87-96 supra and accompanying text.
169. December 10, 1971 and March 27, 1972; see note 147 supra.
170. May 4, 1972; see note 147 supra.
171. That is, April 25, 1973, when Car Color obtained its judgment against the insurance
company, see note 147 supra.
172. But see Firemen's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Ken-Lori Knits, Inc., 399 F. Supp. 286, 291
(E.D.N.Y. 1975). However, the court was applying post-1966 law and should not, it would seem,
have even discussed the choateness doctrine but rather should have confined itself to the
definitional requirements of § 6323(h)(1).
173. 384 F. Supp. at 97. Had PPG relied solely on the assignment to it of the proceeds of the
insurance policy contained in the original security agreement, its claim would clearly have been
held subordinate to that of the government. As the district court pointed out: "The law in New
York is well settled that an assignment of a future interest in the proceeds of a claim is equitable
only, and does not become a legal assignment until the proceeds have come into existence ...
Moreover, the ripening of an equitable lien into a legal lien does not relate back to the date of the
execution of the original instrument." Id. at 95 (citations omitted). An interesting case which the
district court discussed at some length is Andrello v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 29 App.
Div. 2d 489, 289 N.Y.S.2d 293 (4th Dep't 1968) which was decided under pre-1966 law. In
Andrello, the claim of two mortgagees of the debtor's real property to fire insurance proceeds
payable by reason of damage to the mortgaged property was held prior in right to the
government's claim based on tax assessments which were never properly filed, where the
mortgage specifically provided that the debtor would keep the mortgaged property insured
against fire loss for the benefit of the mortgagees. The court found that the mortgagees were
"pledgees" of the insurance fund within the meaning of the pre-1966 § 6323(a) and thus took
priority over the government's improperly filed (i.e., unfiled) tax liens. It should be noted that the
term "pledgee" is included in the term "holder of a security interest" under the FTLA; see House
Report, supra note 97, at 35. Thus, under the holding of Andrello the mortgagees would also be
"holders of a security interest" in the insurance fund under the FTLA. This is, in fact, what the
trial court in Andrello had held in mistakenly applying the amended section 6323(a) retroactively.
29 App. Div. 2d at 492, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 296-97.
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liens are to be resolved according to federal law, 1 74 agreed with the district
court's liberal interpretation of "in existence"' 7 5 and thereby repudiated the
actual existence requirement which had been advocated in Billy's Burgers. 176
The circuit court concluded:
If anything, the "existence" requirement of § 6323(h)(1) is satisfied by the existence of
an available insurance policy. Any contrary result would penalize the very party
responsible for the existence of this fund in the first place. As PPG rightfully points
out, had Car Color not taken out an insurance policy, the Government would have
had no assets against which its two claims could have been satisfied. Furthermore, the
tax lien would clearly have been subordinate 17to PPG's security interest in the inventory
and equipment if there had been no fire.1
The court's liberal interpretation of section 6323(h)(1) is consistent with
both the policy of article 9178 and that of the FTLA 7 9 to protect the interests
of secured creditors as well as with the policy of the FTLA to conform the
Internal Revenue laws to the business concepts of the UCC. 180 It is therefore
submitted that the Second Circuit was correct in holding that a continuing
UCC security interest in insurance proceeds meets all the requirements for a
federally defined security interest, so as to take priority over a federal tax lien
filed after the security interest comes into actual existence.' 8 1 It is further
submitted that the court was also correct in its determination that such a
security interest comes into existence within the meaning of section 6323(h)(1)
when the secured party perfects its security interest in the original collateral
and the debtor obtains rights in an insurance policy covering the collateral
which is payable to either the debtor or the secured party. 182 Despite some
174. 531 F.2d at 61; see, e.g., Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513-14 (1960); United
States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 49 (1950).
175. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(h)(1)(A).
176. See notes 124-26 supra and accompanying text. "(T]he district court's interpretation of [§
6323(h)(1)] is the only one which makes sense from a policy standpoint. Admittedly the proceeds
did not come into existence until a judgment was obtained against Hartford, however, the
original security interest was not in the after acquired proceeds but in the debtor's inventory and
equipment. When this was destroyed, PPG's security interest continued under 9-306(1), first in
the existing insurance policy and then in the funds which were paid out of that policy." 531 F.2d
at 62 (italics omitted).
177. Id. (italics and footnotes omitted). In the alternative, the court held that the case "fit
within the statutory exception as a 'commercial transaction financing agreement' secured by
inventory, with the insurance simply being a substitute for the inventory" under Int. Rev. Code
of 1954, § 6323(c). 531 F.2d at 62 n.6. This holding would seem to be incorrect as a matter of
statutory construction. Section 6323(c)(2) states unequivocally that property protected by § 6323(c)
must be "acquired by the taxpayer before the 46th day after the date of the tax lien filing." Int.
Rev. Code of 1954, § 6323(c)(2)(B); see Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. United States, 466 F.2d 1040,
1051 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973). Notice of the tax liens was filed almost
one year before the debtor (Car Color) acquired the insurance proceeds; see note 147 supra.
178. See note 35 supra and accompanying text.
179. See notes 100-03 supra and accompanying text.
180. See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
181. 531 F.2d at 62-63.
182. Id.
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unanswered questions, 18 3 the opinion in PPG Industries goes far towards
clarifying some difficult problems involving UCC section 9-306, the relationship of the UCC to the FTLA and the relationship of the FTLA to the
choateness doctrine.
V.

CONCLUSION

It should be evident that insurance payments can be "proceeds" under the
1962 version of UCC section 9-306 and that the choateness doctrine has been
superseded as to consensual security interests by the enactment of the FTLA.
It should also be clear that both "proceeds" acquired after the tax lien filing
date pursuant to a security interest perfected before that date and contract
rights can be "property" which is "in existence" under section 6323(h)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code. Thus the holder of a security interest in insured
collateral which is subsequently destroyed in an insured event should be
entitled to the insurance proceeds over a government claim based on a
subsequently filed tax lien to the extent that the security interest was perfected
as of the
date of the tax lien filing under the applicable provisions of the
184
UCC.

A caveat is nevertheless in order. Because of the maze of conflicting
decisions on the subject and the complexity of the issues involved, courts may
not apply these principles with the same clarity and confidence as did the
Second Circuit in PPG Industries. Furthermore, the result may be open to
collateral attack on the insurance as "proceeds" issue by a contrary New York
state court decision. In addition, two recent district court cases have shown
that the Quigley and Universal C.I.T. line of cases still has some vitality,' ss
Furthermore, such corollary questions as whether payments by a manufacturer to a debtor in settlement of a breach of warranty claim on the secured
183. See notes 157-67 supra and accompanying text; note 177 supra.
184. Thus, the insurance policy must be obtained prior to the date on which the federal lien is
filed. Otherwise the security interest in the insurance proceeds will not have been timely
perfected. Under the UCC, the debtor must have rights in the collateral before the secured party's
interest can attach. UCC § 9-204(1); UCC § 9-203 (1972 version). The debtor will, of course, not
be the owner of any contract right under the policy to which this interest can attach until the
policy is obtained.
185. Hamilton Bank v. Bell, 19 UCC Rep. Serv. 334 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), decided
almost three weeks after PPG Industries, came to the opposite conclusion on similar facts. The
district court, sitting in bankruptcy, there held that the bank's perfected security interest in the
bankrupts inventory and fixtures, which had been destroyed in a fire, did not extend to the
insurance proceeds under the Tennessee Uniform Commercial Code. Tennessee has not adopted
the 1972 amendments to article 9. The court noted the commentators' criticism of the QuigleyUniversal C.I.T. line of cases but nevertheless found those cases "highly persuasive." Id. at 335.
The court did not, however, cite PPG Industries.
In Appliance Buyers Credit Corp. v. Stikes, 18 UCC Rep. Serv. 576 (S.D. Ala.
1975), another bankruptcy case, neither the security agreement nor the filed financing statement
covered "proceeds" of the collateral. But the district court stated in dictum that "even if the
security agreement had included 'proceeds,' it has been authoritatively held that funds payable
under a policy of insurance upon the destruction of the collateral do not constitute 'proceeds'
within the meaning of the Uniform Commercial Code." Id. at 579.
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collateral, 186 or payments to a debtor by a third party tort-feasor in satisfac18 7
tion of the debtor's damage claim for tortious destruction of the collateral,
can be "proceeds" have been answered in the negative by the courts. It
remains to be seen whether the decision in PPG Industries, or the adoption of

the 1972 amendments to article 9 will affect the result in these cases. Thus,
secured creditors should ensure that every possible step is taken under state
law to strengthen their interest in any insurance payments which might arise

by reason of loss or damage to collateral. 188

Theodore N. Farris
186. See In re Continental Trucking, Inc., 16 UCC Rep. Serv. 526 (M.D. Fla. 1974),
discussed in note 67 supra; 9 UCC Law Letter 3 (T. Quinn ed. Sept. 1975).
187. See Hoffman v. Snack, 37 Pa. D. & C.2d 145 (C.P. 1964), discussed in notes 68-72 supra
and accompanying text.
188. In addition to perfecting the security interest in the original collateral and filing a
financing statement which claims "proceeds" (in those states which have not adopted the 1972
amendments to article 9), such steps might include: (1) making the debtor agree to insure the
collateral for the benefit of the secured party; (2) making the debtor execute an assignment of all
sums which become payable under the insurance policy to the secured party; (3) arranging to have
the secured party named as loss-payee on the insurance policy. This last step may be necessary as
a practical matter even in states which have adopted the 1972 amendments; see note 79 supra.

